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CONGRESS, CORPORATE BOARDS, AND OVERSIGHT:
A PUBLIC LAW/PRIVATE LAW COMPARISON
Paul S. Miller *
[An] important requirement for the proper functioning of
market competition is also not often, if ever, covered in lists of
factors contributing to economic growth and standards of liv-
ing: trust in the word of others .... When trust is lost, a na-
tion's ability to transact business is palpably undermined.'
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past forty years, the practice of the United States
electorate has been to divide the executive and the legislative
branches of the federal government between the Democratic and
Republican political parties.2 A consequence of divided govern-
* DePaul University College of Law. J.D., Fordham University; M.F.A., Temple Uni-
versity Tyler School of Art.
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1. Alan Greenspan, Markets and the Judiciary, Address at the Sandra Day O'Connor
Project on the State of the Judiciary Conference 3-4 (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http:/!
www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/Greenspan.pdf.
2. During the administrations of Richard Nixon (1969-74), Gerald Ford (1974-77),
Ronald Reagan (1981-89), George H.W. Bush (1989-93), William J. Clinton (1993-2001),
and George W. Bush (2001-2009), the opposing party controlled at least one, if not both,
houses of Congress for the majority of their tenures. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2331 (2006).
Political party politics play a vital role in our system of government. It is party politics,
not the separation of powers, that provides the key defense for representative democracy.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 5 (2005). "The success of
American democracy overwhelmed the Madisonian conception of separation of powers al-
most from the outset, preempting the political dynamics that were supposed to provide
each branch with a 'will of its own' that would propel departmental '[a]mbition.. . to coun-
teract ambition.'" Levinson & Pildes, supra, at 2313 (alteration in original) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)). This is despite the Founders' great desire to avoid
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ment has been the desire of the executive branch to evade the au-
thority of a hostile legislature. Expanding executive power has
been justified as necessary to effectively meet a complex, if not
outright hostile, world, but its practical result has been to further
policies thwarted by the opposing party in the legislature. 3 This
practice has been followed by both Democratic and Republican
administrations.4
A consequence of this period of divided government is that po-
litical campaigning essentially never ends. Fundraising for the
next campaign begins even before the current election is won or
lost. Politicians spend more time with constituents or lobbyists
than with their fellow officeholders. Single-issue activists bom-
bard elected officials and are known to launch rebellions against
incumbents within their own party over perceived or actual fail-
the creation of parties:
All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associ-
ations under whatever plausible character with the real design to direct, con-
trol, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted
authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tenden-
cy. They serve to organize faction; to give it an artificial and extraordinary
force; to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party,
often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, ac-
cording to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public ad-
ministration the mirror of the illconcerted and incongruous projects of fac-
tion, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by
common councils and modified by mutual interests.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. DOC. No. 106-21, at 14 (2000), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senatefarewell/sd106-21.pdf.
3. The chief means of accomplishing this desire has been the usurpation of legisla-
tive authority by the executive, particularly with the rulemaking power of administrative
agencies (albeit with some help from the usurped legislature). See Levinson & Pildes, su-
pra note 2, at 2356-57 ("There is some tension, to put it mildly, between the assumption
that Congress is perpetually engaged in cutthroat competition for power with the execu-
tive and the reality of massive congressional delegations of authority to the executive
branch."). The executive has both size and efficiency on its side. Even counting individual
and committee staffs, the number of people who carry out the work of the U.S. Congress
pales when compared to the executive administrative agencies. Furthermore, the adminis-
trative agencies operate under the control of one person, the President, or his directly ap-
pointed agents, whereas the Congress has 535 individual members, and even the leader-
ship of the majority party only directly controls a fraction of the congressional staff.
4. For example, in 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services under Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan promulgated regulations that forbade any clinic receiving family
planning funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act to discuss the availability of
abortion. See 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2922 (Feb. 2, 1988). This decision was upheld by the Su-
preme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991). In 1993, one of the first acts
of the Clinton administration was to rescind those regulations. 58 Fed. Reg. 7462, 7462
(Feb. 5, 1993). This action affected thousands, if not tens of thousands, of people, and Con-
gress had no say in the matter.
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ure to address their casus belli. News outlets, mainstream and
otherwise, operate 24/7, which often leads to politicians making
decisions with an eye to the camera and the media, putting out
stories with a view to what viewers will watch, not what they
need to know. In short, matters tend to be examined through the
lens of the next election, or next news cycle, as opposed to the
long-term state of the nation.
This situation in civil governance is mirrored in corporate go-
vernance. One can substitute "Chief Executive Officer" for "Presi-
dent" and "Board of Directors" for "Congress," and many news
stories point to an executive that dominates the representative
body. Likewise, substitute "profits reports" for "election results,"
"shareholder activists" for "political activists," and "stock analyst"
for "political analyst," and general observations are essentially
interchangeable. The consequences are the same in both worlds:
the perceived need for short-term success supplants long-term
planning, deliberative bodies have their role in policymaking
dramatically diminished, and criticism is viewed as tantamount
to betrayal.
This environment has diminished the role of oversight in both
civil and corporate governance. Even if the legislature or a board
of directors is in agreement with the policies and actions of its re-
spective executive, it is discouraged from meaningfully asserting
its independence, especially by acting against or criticizing the
policies of the executive, in the name of loyalty. In recent decades,
both the federal government and the corporate world have been
afflicted not just by scandal but by out-and-out failures of poli-
cies, which in turn have led to the foundering of their respective
enterprises, reflected at the ballot box and in stock prices. Robust
oversight could have prevented these failures or, at the very
least, ensured that the failures were not the result of incompe-
tence.
Because the problems faced by the legislature and boards of di-
rectors are similar, this article will explore how corporate law
scholarship has sought to address the problems of corporate over-
sight and apply them to civil government. 5 The issue is not one of
5. Corporate governance, as an area of law and scholarship, has focused on what is
known as the agency problem of large corporations. This problem is caused by the fact
that the owners of a publicly held corporation, the shareholders, are often completely dis-
connected from the day-to-day operations of the company and must rely on agents, officers
2010]
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legal justification, of which there is plenty.6 The question is one of
practice, namely, what are the goals of oversight and how should
those goals be achieved? The focus will be on comparing Con-
gress's oversight powers with those of boards of directors.
Recent articles in corporate governance have applied behavior-
al economic research to suggest the emergence of an approach to
corporate governance that seeks not so much to delineate where
responsibility, and thereby legal liability, exists, but instead to
develop mechanisms that make it easier for parties with dispa-
rate interests to trust one another.' Such an approach would be a
useful antidote to the current problems of civil government as
well.
The first part of this article discusses the oversight function of
the U.S. Congress. This will involve a review of the investigative
power of Congress and an exploration of the consequences, bene-
ficial and otherwise, of legislative oversight using two well-known
examples-the Committee on the Conduct of the War from the
Civil War era and the Truman Committee from World War I1.8
and managers, to run the business. These agents often have different interests than those
of the shareholders.
The traditional way to control these agents was to construe them akin to trustees since
they hold and use the assets of others. However, because successful business involves risk
and risk entails failure, holding corporate agents to the same high standards as actual
trustees was seen as counter to the risk-sharing purposes of corporate law. The resulting
debate has always been about where and how to strike a balance. See Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1781-82 (2001). See generally infra Part III.C.
Beginning in the late 1980s, corporate governance scholars have been debating how
beneficial it is for statutes, regulations, and case law to insist upon oversight of executives
by boards. The debate has essentially divided into two schools of thought: (1) those who
believe that monitoring obligations should be a matter of "contract" between shareholders
and the corporation and (2) those who believe that the trustee model is correct, as there
are vital reasons for viewing the shareholder/agent relationship as different from a mere
contractual relationship. See Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, Contract and Fi-
duciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as De-
fault Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (1995). See generally infra Part III.C.
6. These justifications for the U.S. Congress are addressed in Part ILA, while the
justifications for corporate governance are addressed in Part III.A.
7. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1744; Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M.
Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New"
Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 270-72 (2006).
8. The choice of oversight committees during times of war is deliberate. It is during
times of war that the executive branch asserts that oversight interferes with the alacrity
required to meet national emergencies. Exploring oversight in such extreme situations
will provide the best benchmarks, good and bad, of legislative oversight.
[Vol. 44:771
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Having explored the scope and consequences of legislative
oversight, the article will then shift to the corporate realm. It will
explore the current legal rules of corporate governance and the
existent crisis of confidence in these rules as practiced. Further, it
will review the developing realignment of legal doctrine which
views trust, rather than legal or market sanctions, as the pivotal
component governing relations between shareholders and execu-
tives. This section will conclude with an evaluation of what
shareholders, directors, and executives stand to gain by a shift
from the external impetus of sanctions to the internal motivation
of trust.
This notion of trust in corporate governance will then be ap-
plied to civil governance. Specifically, the article will explore how
trust in the relationship between a board of directors (which
stands in proxy for shareholders) and the executives of a corpora-
tion can cause businesses to function more effectively. This is di-
rectly paralleled in civil governance by the relationship between
Congress (as the representative of the people) and the President
(as the executive of the country).
But, some may question, is this really a fair comparison? After
all, a corporation has only one ultimate goal, namely, to make a
profit. Our national civil government, however, has multiple and
sometime contradictory goals.9 Furthermore, there is competition
among multiple companies in any given field in the private sec-
tor,10 while there is only one national civil government-one Con-
gress, one President-and any competition or potential competi-
tion is strictly internal. The better argument, though, is that the
singular nature of government, with its multiple responsibilities,
constituencies, and goals, justifies robust oversight, especially
when the legislative and executive branches are in the hands of
the same political party."
9. For example, government has an obligation to protect the population from crime
but also to protect those under investigation and indictment from too ardent enforcers of
the law.
10. One only has to recall that Microsoft, a company found to be a monopoly for its
Windows computer operating system, still faced competition from the Apple and Oracle
corporations for similar products.
11. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 2, at 2316.
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II. OVERSIGHT BY CONGRESS
This article ultimately posits that trust is the key element for
any system of governance to be successful. This section seeks to
demonstrate the efficacy of trust by looking at two congressional
investigative committees. The absence or presence of trust that
existed between all parties involved in these investigations
played a key role in the success or failure of the committees in
their mission.
A. The Power of Oversight-An Overview
Congress's ability to oversee executive branch activities derives
from its power to legislate and investigate. As stated in the Con-
stitution: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States .... ,,12 The power to investigate
is part of that legislative power. According to the Supreme Court
in McGrain v. Daugherty, "[a] legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change." 13
Thus, an investigation undertaken by Congress that could poten-
tially lead to legislation is well within its powers regardless of
whether a statute actually emerges.14
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. State constitutions provide the same power to their own
legislatures. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of this State is vested in
the California Legislature .... "); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of this
state shall be vested in the senate and assembly.").
13. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
14. See id. at 177; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111, 134 (1959) (uphold-
ing a conviction for contempt of Congress for failure to testify before the House Un-
American Activities Committee and stating that "[t]he scope of the power of inquiry, in
short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate
under the Constitution"); Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers,
558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 77 (D.D.C. 2008) ("So long as the Committee is investigating a matter
on which Congress can ultimately propose and enact legislation, the Committee may issue
subpoenas in furtherance of its power of inquiry.").
This investigative function of Congress is not merely one of constitutional permission;
both common law and statutes allow Congress to hold in contempt those who refuse to an-
swer its questions. The common law contempt power of legislative bodies has been recog-
nized as far back as 1821. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228-29 (1821) ("That a
deliberate assembly, clothed with the majesty of the people, and charged with the care of
all that is dear to them . . . should not possess the power to suppress rudeness, or repel
insult, is a supposition too wild to be suggested."). It has also been cited as recently as
1972. See, e.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 500 (1972) ("Legislatures are not constituted
to conduct full-scale trials or quasi-judicial proceedings and we should not demand that
[Vol. 44:771
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Congressional investigative powers were recognized prior to
the Supreme Court decision in McGrain. Even before the Civil
War it was observed that,
[T]here was nothing particularly unique about the legislative branch
attempting to influence the executive. And despite the president's
role as commander in chief, it was commonly thought that Congress
ought to play an important part in shaping and directing the armed
forces because "in military matters Presidents serve as Congress's
steward."
15
Until the Civil War, it was Congress, not the President, that was
seen as the locus of power and authority within the federal gov-
ernment.16 Even with the ascendance of the executive branch dur-
they do so although they possess inherent power to protect their own processes and exis-
tence by way of contempt proceedings.").
In 1857, Congress passed a contempt statute to delegate the authority to enforce legisla-
tive contempt. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 192
(2006)). The current version of the statute provides:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of
either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any
matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established
by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any
committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, hav-
ing appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under
inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for
not less than one month nor more than twelve months.
2 U.S.C. § 192 (2006). There is currently some controversy as to the efficacy of the statute
in the event of presidential resistance to congressional inquiry. 18 U.S.C. § 194 states
that, upon violation of § 192, the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House will re-
port the violation "to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action." However, no provisions are made for
the failure of the U.S. Attorney to act on a matter. The controversy between President
George W. Bush and Congress regarding the dismissal of eight U.S. attorneys and the
President's refusal to accept the right of Congress to issue subpoenas calling for two of his
aides to testify in the matter indicates that this problem may not be purely academic for
much longer. The D.C. District Court has already ruled that Congress does, in fact, have
the right of subpoena in this matter. Miers, 558 F. Supp 2d at 108. It remains to be seen
whether this will be settled through political means.
For a slightly more detailed discussion of this matter, see 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.2 (4th ed. 2007).
The Supreme Courts of Louisiana and Pennsylvania have relied on Groppi to uphold
their legislatures' ability to punish those who choose to defy a legislative investigation.
House of Representatives v. Bernard, 373 So. 2d 188, 194-95 (La. 1979); Commonwealth
ex rel. Carcaci v. Brandamore, 327 A.2d 1, 4-5 (Pa. 1974).
15. BRUCE TAP, OVER LINCOLN'S SHOULDER: THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF
THE WAR 22 (1998) (quoting HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 144 (1973)).
16. Id. at 13 ("Within the federal government, Congress seemed to have the lion's
share of responsibilities. The powers of Congress are spelled out in great detail in the
Constitution, yet those of the president are much more vague and ambiguous.").
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ing the nineteenth century, Congress continued to be considered
the ensurer of the people's will. In 1885, Woodrow Wilson stated
that "[tihe informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function. The argument is not only that dis-
cussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and effi-
cient administration, but, more than that, that the only really
self-governing people is that people which discusses and interro-
gates its administration.17
Nor did the idea of legislative oversight diminish, even in the
face of extreme circumstances or war. Harry S. Truman, writing
in his autobiography, stated:
The power to investigate is necessary to the intelligent exercise of
the powers of Congress. This is especially true in wartime, when the
Congress must delegate many of its powers. Only by investigation
can it review the exercise of them and ascertain how and to what ex-
tent they should be modified-by legislation if necessary, by execu-
tive action if possible."5
It is not enough, however, to demonstrate that oversight of the
executive is contained within the DNA of Congress. How this
power is used and whether it furthers or diminishes the actual
execution of government policy is an important matter to consid-
er. The results of Congress' use of its oversight power runs along
a spectrum, the extremes of which are represented by the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War and the Senate Committee
to Investigate the Defense Program.
B. Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War
The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War ("CCW") was
created in December 1861 and continued its activities until May
1865.1 While its make-up changed over the years, it was initially
comprised of three senators and four representatives, five of
whom were Republicans and two of whom were Democrats."
17. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 303 (15th ed. 1900).
18. 1 HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 168 (1955).
19. TAP, supra note 15, at 22-24, 250-51.
20. See id. at 24. The CCW in the 37th Congress was made up of Senate Republicans
Benjamin F. Wade and Zachariah Chandler, Senate Democrat Andrew Johnson, House
Republicans George W. Julian, John Covode, and Daniel W. Gooch, and House Democrat
Moses Fowler Odell. See id. When Johnson became the governor of Tennessee in 1862, Jo-
[Vol. 44:771
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When Confederate gunfire bombarded Fort Sumter on April 12,
1861, Congress was not in session and President Abraham Lin-
coln was determined to act immediately rather than wait for
Congress to convene in special session.21 He instead relied on his
authority as commander in chief.22 Congress, when it did finally
meet in special session beginning July 4, 1861, approved Lin-
coln's actions retroactively on the assumption that they would re-
sult in a swift suppression of the rebellion and thereby obviate
the need for greater congressional involvement.23 However, the
First Battle of Bull Run ended expectations of a quick victory,
and a series of disasters, scandals, and flat-out disagreements
over war strategy quickly eroded Congress's faith in Lincoln.24 In
December of 1861, Congress asserted itself and created the
CCW.25
What was different about the CCW, crucially different from
earlier committees, was the broadness of its mandate. Previously,
congressional investigative committees had focused on events
that had already occurred. 26 The CCW, however, was explicitly
granted the authority not only to investigate past military disas-
ters but also to oversee current military conduct and ongoing ac-
tions by other branches of government. 27 This "elastic resolution"
seph A. Wright replaced him. Id. at 27. The 38th Congress had the same membership,
save that Benjamin F. Harding replaced Wright and Benjamin F. Loan replaced Covode.
Id. at 175.
21. See id. at 11, 13.
22. Id. at 13 ("Lincoln did not waste time worrying over constitutional niceties in tak-
ing the steps he believed were necessary in dealing with the rebellion. Instead of calling
Congress into session, Lincoln acted in his capacity as commander in chief. In addition to
his call for 75,000 three-month volunteers, he implemented quickly a series of measures
designed to prosecute the war .... ). Other measures Lincoln took included imposing a
naval blockade on the rebellious states and suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
23. See id. at 13-14 ("When Congress met in a special session beginning on July 4,
1861, Lincoln asked for approval of the measures he had implemented. Congress endorsed
the president's actions .... If Lincoln were to take the initiative, then he had better deliv-
er-and deliver quickly. Congressional leaders wanted and expected quick results .... ").
24. See id. at 22 ("Republican congressmen, in particular, had observed helplessly one
military disaster after another. They had in the special summer session agreed to the
president's actions retroactively; they had accepted his leadership as commander in chief;
they had patiently awaited the movement of the Army of the Potomac, only to be fru-
strated time after time. They were running out of patience, and for many congressional
leaders, the sad state of military affairs reflected negatively on Abraham Lincoln.").
25. See id. at 24.
26. Id. at 34.
27. Id. at 24.
2010]
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gave the CCW the ability to exercise great influence, an ability
that it clearly recognized and sought to exploit:
Your committee therefore concluded.., that they would best per-
form their duty by endeavoring to obtain such information in respect
to the conduct of the war as would best enable them to advise what
mistakes had been made in the past and the proper course to be pur-
sued in the future.
28
Unfortunately, the CCW ultimately used its broad mandate to
pursue blatantly political and partisan ends.2 9 This is not to say
that the CCW did not do some good. For example, it uncovered ir-
regularities in ice contracts and conducted investigations into the
manufacturing of heavy ordnance and logistical operations in
New York and Philadelphia. 0 It also bolstered Union war efforts
by bringing to light the atrocities committed by Confederate
forces at Fort Pillow and the treatment of Union prisoners of
war. 1 However, the CCW's approach to most issues reflected the
personalities of Senators Benjamin F. Wade and Zachariah
Chandler, its two most dominant members2 2 Tap describes Wade
thus:
Perhaps Wade's most notable characteristics were his stubborn
combativeness on political issues and his devotion to principle....
Wade's recipe for victory included such radical measures as emanci-
pation and the confiscation of rebel property.... Wade also had a
stormy relationship with Lincoln, criticizing him for relying on such
suspect advisers as William H. Seward and violently disagreeing
with his reconstruction policy.
13
Chandler was, if possible, even more extreme:
Sharing Wade's antislavery convictions, Chandler was equally
uncompromising and combative. Opposing any compromise with the
South on slavery, he was quoted in the campaign of 1860: "Without a
little bloodletting, this Union would not be worth a rush.". . . From
the beginning of the war, Chandler endorsed such radical measures
as emancipation, confiscation, and the arming of black troops....
Routinely denouncing northern Democrats as disloyal Copper-
heads and believing many of the rumors about secret societies,
Chandler's frank and bitter rhetoric often placed him at the center of
28. Id. at 34 (quoting REPORT OF THE J. COMM. ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, S. REP.
NO. 37-108, at 4 (1863)).
29. Id. at 258.
30. Id. at 176-77.
31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 22-24.
33. Id. at 25.
[Vol. 44:771
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the controversy.... Like Wade, Chandler was impatient with the
caution of West Point generals. After one interview with McClel-
lan ... Wade asked Chandler what he thought of military science. "I
don't know much about war," Chandler responded, "but this is infer-
nal, unmitigated cowardice." Although Chandler supported Lincoln's
reelection in 1864, he too was often impatient with the president's
handling of war matters.34
To further their undeniably partisan agenda, Wade and
Chandler used the CCW as a means to supplant and, at times,
override the judgments of military professionals with their own.3 5
They had an ideological belief that constant forward motion was
the only correct strategy for victory.36 The CCW's activities caused
factionalism and undermined the chain of command within the
Union Army as it allowed subordinates to criticize superiors.3 1 Its
hearings and related investigations were frequently conducted in
a manner that merely sought to confirm the committee's prede-
termined conclusions on a matter.3 8 Needless to say, these actions
eroded the military's respect for its civilian masters. 39 Ultimately,
the CCW's abuse of its mandate and its simplistic political ap-
proach to military matters had an undeniably negative impact on
the Union war effort, sometimes leading military officers to take
foolish actions.40
A similar assessment of the CCW came about some eighty
years later:
34. Id. at 26.
35. See id. at 165-66.
36. Id. at 166.
37. Id. at 166, 256. Perhaps the best example of this came from one of the CCW's best
known later victims, George McClellan. McClellan used the CCW to criticize his superior,
Winfield Scott (the triumphant general of the Mexican American War) and succeed him as
the top Union commander. See id. at 18-19. However unfairly history may view the
CCW's later treatment of McClellan, he was a significant figure that used the CCW to fur-
ther his own interests.
38. Id. at 256.
39. See id. at 166.
40. Id. at 256. As this is a particularly bold statement to make in light of civilian con-
trol over the military, consider the following:
The case of Ambrose Burnside at Fredericksburg is instructive. Burnside
was well aware of the public's impatience with the lack of military success in
the Eastern Theater. He also knew that the committee had pursued McClel-
lan because he did not move against the enemy directly. When crucial ele-
ments of his plans failed to materialize, Burnside carried out a foolhardy as-
sault against the well-fortified Marye's Heights because he believed that
public opinion demanded action. The committee bears some responsibility for
increasing such dissatisfaction and impatience.
Id. at 166.
2010]
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I had been reading the records of the Joint Committee on the Con-
duct of the War between the States. These historic records constitute
a most interesting set of documents. That committee of the Union
Congress was said by Douglas Southall Freeman, the biographer of
Robert E. Lee, to have been of material assistance to the Confedera-
cy. 41
Such was the assessment of Harry S. Truman, the chairman of
another legislative committee to oversee national defense, and it
is to this committee that we turn next.
C. Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program
In 1941, prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, Senator Harry S.
Truman became concerned with industry abuses as the United
States began war preparations. Specifically, as Truman later
wrote:
I was concerned about charges that the huge contracts and the
immense purchases that resulted from these appropriations were be-
ing handled through favoritism. There were rumors that some of the
plants had been located on a basis of friendship. I feared that many
of the safeguards usually observed in government transactions were
being thrown aside and overlooked, although these safeguards would
in no way have slowed up the program.42
There were also concerns that the bigger business operations, on
both the labor and capital sides of things, were seeking to elimi-
nate competition, either by having the bulk of contracts steered
towards them or through requisition of heavy machinery from
smaller rivals. 43 Associated social ills arose from this consolida-
tion. For example, there was a lack of housing in areas where op-
41. TRUMAN, supra note 18, at 168. Later in his memoirs, Truman expanded on the
CCW's failings:
Many congressional committees, in the past and in recent times, have been
guilty of departing from their original purposes and jurisdictions. The most
outstanding example of misdirected investigation occurred during the Civil
War when the Committee on the Conduct of the War attempted to direct mil-
itary operations in the field. It was this committee that was responsible for
making Pope commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, which proved
to be an unfortunate decision .... [H]is appearance on the field was soon fol-
lowed by the disaster of the Second Battle of Bull Run....
Id. at 188-89.
42. Id. at 165.
43. Id.
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erations were concentrated and vacant housing in areas where
smaller businesses had, until recently, operated."4
Truman took it upon himself to personally investigate:
I gave a lot of thought to this situation, and when I realized that
it was growing increasingly worse, I decided to take a closer look at
it. I got into my automobile and started out from Washington to
make a little investigation on my own. I drove thirty thousand miles
in a great circle through Maryland and from there down to Florida,
across to Texas, north through Oklahoma to Nebraska, and back
though Wisconsin and Michigan. I visited war camps, defense plants,
and other establishments and projects which had some connection
with the total war effort of the country, and did not let any of them
know who I was.
The trip was an eye-opener, and I came back to Washington con-
vinced that something needed to be done fast. I had seen at first
hand that grounds existed for a good many of the rumors that were
prevalent in Washington concerning the letting of contracts and the
concentration of defense industries in big cities.45
On February 10, 1941, Truman submitted a resolution for the
creation of a special committee to oversee the national defense ef-
fort.46 Its mandate was huge, as broad as that of the CCW: "[T]he
committee was directed to examine every phase of the entire war
program."47 What is significant is that Truman was careful to en-
sure that all members of the committee understood the limits of
the mandate:
It was not organized to tell the war agencies what to do or how to
do it. It was not to substitute its judgment for their judgment. Its
function was to assure that intelligent consideration would be given
to the important and difficult problems presented by the war pro-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 166.
47. Id. at 167. Truman described the scope in greater detail:
The committee had been authorized and directed by the United States Senate
to investigate the operation of the program for the procurement and con-
struction of all supplies, materials, munitions, vehicles, aircraft, vessels,
plants, camps, and other articles and facilities connected with the war pro-
gram. It had also been directed to examine the types and terms of all con-
tracts awarded; the methods by which they were awarded; the contractors se-
lected; the utilization of small business concerns through subcontracts or
otherwise; geographical distribution of contracts and locations of plants and
facilities; the effects of such a program with respect to labor and the migra-
tion of labor; the practices of management or labor; and the benefits accruing
to contractors with respect to amortization for purposes of taxation or other-
wise.
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gram and that the victory would be won with the least cost in lives
and property.4"
Comprised of five Democrats and two Republicans,"9 the Senate
Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (univer-
sally referred to as the "Truman Committee") operated from 1941
to 1948.50 By all accounts, it was a tremendous success, with cre-
dit largely given to the chairman. 51 The Truman Committee's
most important accomplishments were its study of the problems
of mobilization and its attempts to resolve, often privately, con-
flicts between the various agencies involved in the mobilization
effort.12 It also addressed issues of resource shortages and fraud,
saving taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, 53 and was a ma-
jor source of public information about the war effort, which con-
tributed to public confidence in the conduct of the war.54
The Truman Committee accomplished these things by having
critical, but not contentious, relationships with individuals inside
the agencies involved in its investigations. Indeed, the committee
was noted for the degree to which it did not seek out individual
scapegoats for problems or "impugn the motives" of witnesses. 5
At the same time, the committee did not withhold criticism from
those it determined deserving of such, not even from the White
House. 56 These accomplishments were impressive, and the Tru-
man Committee remains the benchmark against which subse-
quent committees should be judged.5 7
D. Trust as the Crucial Difference
There were very few structural differences between the CCW
and the Truman Committee that would explain such different re-
sults. Both committees had very expansive mandates and operat-
ed for more than one session of Congress. Further, the majority of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 166.
50. DONALD H. RIDDLE, THE TRUMAN COMMITTEE: A STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 141 (1964).
51. See id. at 152, 154.
52. Id. at 143-44.
53. Id. at 144-51.
54. Id. at 155-56.
55. Id. at 162.
56. See id. at 159-60.
57. Id. at 165.
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both committees were of the same political party as the president.
So, what was the crucial factor that explains the very different
results of these two committees? The biggest distinction was the
degree to which they did or did not promote trust in those they
were overseeing.
The CCW saw no reason to build trust. It was led by people
who were not merely convinced of the rightness of their cause,
but of the rightness of their means of accomplishing it. Bringing
down political foes went hand in hand with bringing down mili-
tary ones. Those who completely bought into the political mission
were supported, while those who did not were attacked, regard-
less of ability. But such political zealotry did not bring practical
results. As discussed above, the tenure of the CCW proved dis-
astrous, increasing casualty lists and prolonging the war.
In contrast, the Truman Committee cultivated an environment
of trust. For example, the committee never openly questioned the
motives or patriotism of those it supervised. At the same time, it
did not hesitate to criticize the Roosevelt administration when it
felt its policies were wasteful or otherwise unhelpful to the war
effort. Thus, other actors in the war effort and the American pub-
lic largely saw the committee as acting with integrity.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
It is interesting to note that the Framers of the Constitution
sought to create a governmental system whereby the branches of
government would have an essentially adversarial relationship
(i.e., checks and balances). Mutual suspicion, not trust, would
seem key to the success of such a system. Yet trust seems to have
been the crucial difference between the CCW and the Truman
Committee. Thus, the question becomes whether trust actually
can be, or should be, engineered into U.S. political structures.
Several corporate governance theorists argue that a gover-
nance method based upon using either legal or market (i.e., elec-
toral) forces cannot meet the complexity inherent in ensuring
both good policy and effective execution of those policies in a
democratic system. Instead, what is needed is for the actors in a
governance system to act with a degree of trust toward one
another. This approach does not require all sides to already trust
one another; trust can be learned.
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Before this approach to corporate governance can be applied to
civil governance, it must be understood. What follows is a de-
scription of the origins of board oversight in corporations, a dis-
cussion of recent events and trends in corporate governance, and
the rise of a theory of trust in corporate governance. To do this
properly, the discussion of congressional oversight will be sus-
pended for the moment.
A. Oversight by the Board of Directors-An Overview
By law, the basic managing unit of a corporation is its board of
directors. 58 However, in a modern public corporation the board is
not expected to provide actual day-to-day management for the
typical publicly traded company.5 9 Instead, the board's principal
function is "to authorize the most significant corporate acts or
transactions: mergers, changes in capital structure, fundamental
changes in business, appointment and compensation of the CEO,
etc." °6 Yet removal from ordinary operations does not relegate
boards to the sidelines: "[T]he paramount duty of the board of di-
rectors of a public corporation is to select a chief executive officer
and to oversee the CEO and senior management in the competent
and ethical operation of the corporation on a day-to-day basis."1'
58. See e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("[T]he business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
direction of the board."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direc-
tion of a board of directors .... "); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (Consol. 1983) ("[T]he busi-
ness of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors .... ").
59. E.g., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEND-
ATIONS § 3.02 cmt. a (1994) ("Although the statutes literally seem to require the board to
either manage or direct the management of the corporation, it is widely understood that
the board of a publicly held corporation normally cannot and does not perform those func-
tions in the usual sense of those terms."); BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5 (2005) ("Effective corporate directors are diligent monitors,
but not managers, of business operations.").
60. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
61. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 59, at 2. This group went on to state:
In performing its oversight function, the board is entitled to rely on the ad-
vice, reports and opinions of management, counsel, auditors and expert ad-
visers. The board should assess the qualifications of those it relies on and
hold managers and advisers accountable. The board should ask questions and
obtain answers about the processes used by managers and the corporation's
advisers to reach their decisions and recommendations, as well as about the
substance of the advice and reports received by the board. When appropriate,
the board and its committees should seek independent advice.
Id. at 7.
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Court decisions have consistently emphasized this oversight
role. In 1924, then-district Judge Learned Hand wrote that direc-
tors "have an individual duty to keep themselves informed in
some detail" about corporate affairs and to not "be carried along
as ... figurehead[s]." 62 In the 1980s, the Delaware courts empha-
sized the importance of a board's oversight role in merger situa-
tions with the establishment of the Unocal and Revlon stan-
dards.6 3 In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court, in In re Care-
mark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, held directors lia-
ble for failing to act in good faith by the "sustained or systematic
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight" of a corpora-
tion's affairs.64 In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
Cases have arisen where corporate directors have no conflicting self-
interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable
than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material
to the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which does not involve
disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more culpa-
ble than gross negligence, should be proscribed.65
So, not only do boards of directors have the power to oversee cor-
porations, they have a duty, and failure to fulfill that duty can
lead to the personal liability of directors.66
The presence of legal duties, in corporate law as with all types
of law, means that courts can be used to enforce them. Unfortu-
nately, using courts to enforce such duties has long presented
problems. First, the theories of fiduciary duties have their origins
in the rules governing trusts. These rules do not necessarily mesh
62. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
63. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (finding that when a corporation is put up for sale or its demise is otherwise inevit-
able, a board must take necessary measures to ensure that shareholders get the best value
for the sale of the corporation); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55
(Del. 1985) (establishing that, because of concern that directors and managers may wish to
prevent any and all takeovers, the Delaware Supreme Court requires that corporate anti-
takeover measures be adopted in response to legitimate threats to a corporation's interests
and be proportional to the threat in order to be protected by the business judgment rule).
64. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
65. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
66. See id. at 66. As a final piece to indicate the parallels of boards of directors and
legislatures, consider that Boards have the ability to act against those who deny them
access to information. Unlike a legislature, with its contempt power, a board has a much
more direct sanction against those who will not provide the information it seeks: termina-
tion. A board hires the CEO and usually approves, if not actually appoints, other members
of the senior management team. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 59, at 2.
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with the entrepreneurial focus of corporations-investors/share-
holders do not want corporate managers to be so careful with cor-
porate assets that they do nothing with them.6 7 Unlike the reci-
pients of trusts, corporate shareholders are people who knowingly
commit to a venture in which the total loss of monies invested is
possible.6 Recognizing these differences, courts, especially the
Delaware Chancery Court, rely on doctrines such as the business
judgment rule when dealing with oversight issues.6 9 Unfortunate-
ly, events have gotten ahead of the courts, and new approaches
are needed in response to the corporate scandals of the 1990s and
2000s.
B. Crisis of Confidence
The current hyper-partisanship of the political sphere, its
"take-no-prisoners" approach to the opposition, is not unfamiliar
to the corporate sector. The 1970s and 1980s have been referred
to as the "takeover era," a period which saw an extraordinary
number of corporate takeovers and takeover attempts, as well as
new and aggressive means to defeat them.70 It has seen the deci-
sion of Smith v. Van Gorkom by the Delaware Supreme Court,
67. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 224. As Chancellor Allen noted in a foot-
note in Caremark, "[tihe corporate form gets its utility in large part from its ability to al-
low diversified investors to accept greater investment risk." 698 A.2d at 967-68 n.16.
68. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 224.
69. Caremark summarized the business judgment rule well when it stated:
[Cases based upon the direct actions of corporate management] will typically
be subject to review under the director-protective business judgment rule, as-
suming the decision made was the product of a process that was either delibe-
rately considered in good faith or was otherwise rational. What should be un-
derstood, but may not widely be understood by courts or commentators who
are not often required to face such questions, is that compliance with a direc-
tor's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by refer-
ence to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart
from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed.
That is, whether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, be-
lieves a decision substantively wrong ... provides no ground for director lia-
bility, so long as the court determines that the process employed was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.
698 A.2d at 967 (citations omitted).
70. See James M. Tobin, The Squeeze on Directors-Inside is Out, 49 Bus. LAW. 1707,
1707 (1993) ("Focus on takeover defenses, including short term profit maximization, has
left some long term scars and inappropriate fixations. The scars mark years when Ameri-
can companies deemphasized long term investment with consequent diminution of future
(now read current) earnings. The fixations resulted from years of advice to directors con-
cerning the protection afforded them on single event transactions by the business judg-
ment rule in response to the pressures of the takeover era of the 1970's and 1980's.").
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where highly competent directors were found personally liable
when they followed the advice of their chair and CEO in approv-
ing the purchase price of a company.7' It has also seen Delaware
General Corporation Law section 102(b)(7) overrule Van Gorkom,
whereby the Delaware legislature allowed corporations to relieve
their directors of almost any liability for their decisions.72
The 1990s were a period of unprecedented growth in the stock
markets. The Dow Jones Industrial Average increased by approx-
imately 500%, from about 2000 points in 1990 to around 12,000
points in 1999. 73 The Standard & Poor's 500 Index also increased
by 500%, from about 300 points to nearly 1,500 points in the
same period.74 The NASDAQ Composite Index grew from around
500 points to around 4,000 points, an 800% increase. 75 During the
same period, sentencing of corporations increased as well, from
111 in 1995 to 304 in 2000.76
During this period, two types of corporate governance problems
occurred. The first was that of the willfully oblivious board, whe-
reby directors failed to police malfeasance taking place in the
company. The most egregious examples were Abbott Laborato-
71. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("Since a director is
vested with the responsibility for the management of the affairs of the corporation, he
must execute that duty with the recognition that he acts on behalf of others. Such obliga-
tion does not tolerate faithlessness or self-dealing. But fulfillment of the fiduciary function
requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud. Representation of the financial
interests of others imposes on a director an affirmative duty to protect those interests and
to proceed with a critical eye in assessing information of the type and under the circums-
tances present here."), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (stating that a Delaware corporation's
certificate of incorporation may contain "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director. ").
73. The Privateer, The Dow Jones Industrial Average, http://www.the-privateer.com/
chart/dow-long.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
74. New York Stock and Commodity Exchanges, S&P 500 History, http://www.nyse.
tv/s-and-p-500-history.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
75. Amateur-Investors.com, Nasdaq Chart History, http://www.amateur-investor.net/
NasdaqChartHistory.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009). The Index went up another 1000
points in the first three months of 2000 before crashing back to 2,500 at the end of the
year and to near 1,000 by the end of 2002. Id.
Subsequently, the indices respectively lost 33%, 50%, and 400% of their value. The
NASDAQ never regained the value held at the end of the 1990s bull market. Whatever
gains the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Standard & Poor's 500 made were erased
in the bear market of 2008-09. The Privateer, supra note 73; New York Stock and Com-
modity Exchanges, supra note 74; Amateur-Investors.com, supra.
76. Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professio-
nalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 876-77 (2003).
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ries, Enron, and WorldCom. 77 The second problem was that of a
board dominated by a CEO or controlling shareholder that rub-
ber-stamped decisions which ultimately wasted corporate assets.
The Eisner/Ovitz debacle at The Walt Disney Company, because
of the court case it spawned, is the most important example of a
dominated board.78 These numerous scandals led to a loss of faith
in officers, directors, and the corporate model itself.79
There have been essentially two types of reactions to these
board failures. The first reaction has been to create new rules to
curtail bad behavior. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new listing
requirements for the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")sl are
two well-known examples of this reaction. Whether the rules put
in place by Sarbanes-Oxley and the NYSE will be effective re-
mains to be seen. History provides reason to believe that such
rules will only result in creative circumvention (much as corpora-
tions, businesses, and private individuals exploit tax loopholes) 2
or create perverse incentives (such as increased disclosure of ex-
ecutive pay leading to even higher pay packages across the board
since no company wants its CEO pay to be "below average").s3
The second reaction came from the Delaware courts, the best
example of which is In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litiga-
tion.s4 In a series of decisions, the Chancery and Supreme Courts
of Delaware have created a "new" legal standard to address the
77. In the Abbott Laboratories matter, the board failed to set up procedures that
would have detected falsified laboratory reports after they became aware of the problem,
which led to the largest civil fine ever levied by the FDA and the destruction of $250 mil-
lion in corporate assets. In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F. 3d
795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003). Enron and WorldCom involved falsified record keeping that led to
the shares being way overvalued. See Kathleen F. Brickley, From Enron to WorldCom and
Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 363 n.29, 372 (2003).
78. See generally In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
Even as the scandals were developing, there was substantial clamor for corporate boards
to raise their ethical standards. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 265, 265-66 (1997) [hereinafter Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously]; Duggin & Goldman,
supra note 7, at 259-61.
79. E.g., Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 261.
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
81. Order Approving NYSE and NASDAQ Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corpo-
rate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003).
82. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 262.
83. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 39, 44-45 (2004) [hereinafter Fisch, Federal Regulation].
84. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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"structural bias" of corporate boards.8 5 While boards cannot be
viewed as engaged in self-dealing, it cannot be said that they are
acting solely as disinterested fiduciaries.16 In Disney, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court held, and the Delaware Supreme Court af-
firmed, that directors can be liable for failing to act in good faith8 7
and that an "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard
for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although not the only)
standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted in good
faith."ss
However, while the Delaware courts may have created a new
legal standard concerning liability, to date, no director has been
found liable based upon such a duty, including in the Disney case
itself.9 So it seems the Delaware courts view their own legal
standard to be, at best, "modest."90 Modest though it may be, this
standard is nevertheless worthy of exploration, and will be dis-
85. Disney involved actions taken by Disney CEO Michael Eisner in the hiring and
firing of Michael Ovitz as president of Disney during 1995-96. It was not the hiring and
firing itself that drew the ire of the shareholders so much as the $130 million dollars Ovitz
received when he was let go. The case had several pre-trial opinions, an extensive bench
trial, and two appearances before the Delaware Supreme Court (one on the initial motion
to dismiss, the other after final judgment). Id. at 35-36. Ultimately, the company defen-
dants, including the Disney Board of Directors, prevailed. Id.
However, this is not to say the Disney board escaped unscathed. They were described,
albeit indirectly, as "supine" to the "imperial CEO" Michael Eisner. In re The Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 & n.487 (Del. Ch. 2005). Chancellor Chandler
stated: "Eisner stacked his (and I intentionally write 'his' as opposed to 'the Company's')
board of directors with friends and other acquaintances who, though not necessarily be-
holden to him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and
support him unconditionally than truly independent directors." Id. at 760-61. The Ovitz
litigation, and the problems it revealed, caused Eisner to be removed as chairman of Dis-
ney in February 2004 and forced to retire by September 2005. See Laura M. Holson, Next
Disney Chief Plans Company's Transformation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at Cl; Nick
Madigan, New Sport in Hollywood: Watching Eisner's Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at
Cl; Floyd Norris, For Eisner, A Sharp Turn on a Trip Through Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2004, at C1.
86. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32
J. CORP. L. 833, 839 (2006) ("[S]tructural bias results on account of (a) the shared group
membership between directors and officers, (b) the bonds of collegiality, and (c) the perni-
cious golden rule-treating other directors and officers as one would want to be treated in
one's capacity as an officer of another corporation. These all come together to yield condi-
tions in which directors' motivations are not strictly fiduciary in nature, but are also not
classically self-serving."). The Unocal and Revlon standards, discussed supra note 63 and
accompanying text, seek to address the same problem in different circumstances.
87. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del. 2006).
88. Id. at 62 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755
(Del. Ch. 2005)).
89. See id. at 35-36; Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
90. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 259.
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cussed later in light of its possible applications to the matter of
congressional oversight.
C. The Rise of Trust in Corporate Governance
The Delaware courts' actions have not resolved the bounds of
what the directors' fiduciary duties should be. This has provided
a new opportunity for corporate law scholars to devote time and
energy to the question of corporate governance.9 1 Until recently,
the matter of corporate governance has been dominated by a bit-
ter argument between two entrenched ideologies.
Scholars have long debated the issue of corporate governance.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the debate has resulted not in consensus
but rather in a contentious quarrel. The dispute concerning cor-
porate governance is a cultural one, turning on the importance of
and interpretation of key corporate law doctrine. Fiduciary duties
are of particular concern, namely the consequences of these long-
recognized duties, whether such duties are useful to modern cor-
porate law, and whether they were ever valid. Van Gorkom, in
particular, limns this divide.9 2 Unfortunately, as with many dis-
putes, it has given rise to an environment where "[e]xaggeration
is the norm; conversation the exception. '93 This "war" has now
91. A far more detailed discussion of this debate can be found in Blair & Stout, supra
note 5, at 1780-89.
92. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7 at 231 ("Delaware's new statute, codified as
section 102(b)(7) of the state's General Corporation Law, eviscerated Van Gorkom by per-
mitting corporations to limit, or even eliminate, the personal liability of directors for al-
most all breaches of the duty of care."); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 86, at 836 ("For the
most part, the courts are unwilling to hold that defendants have been grossly negligent.
The one time that they did, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the decision shocked the corporate
law community, and drew a very quick reaction from the Delaware legislature. Scholars
still harshly criticize the decision; indeed, a bashing of Van Gorkom is a ritual of entry in-
to the ranks of the respectable corporate law scholarly community." (footnotes omitted));
John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to Assert Sec-
tion 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 111, 113 (2004) ("To help alleviate the consequences and concerns of directors following
Van Gorkom, § 102(b)(7), as enacted, permits Delaware corporations to authorize provi-
sions in their certificates of incorporation limiting or eliminating the personal liability of
directors for breaches of fiduciary duty. .. ").
93. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on
the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Go-
vernance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2007).
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gone on for almost three decades between, essentially, two camps:
the contractarians and the anticontractarians.94
The contractarians, following law and economics theory, hold
that fiduciary duties are best regarded as a default rule in the
"contract" formed between a corporation and its shareholders.9 5
That is, there is "nothing special" about them. 6 In this model, to
reduce transaction costs, investors can "opt out" of monitoring du-
ties simply by purchasing stock in a corporation with none.97 Fur-
ther, contractarians hold that courts should refrain from interfer-
ing and let each party in the fiduciary relationship determine
what mix of benefits and costs is appropriate.
The anticontractarians argue that, under the contractarian ap-
proach, "[f]iduciaries will be permitted to act negligently and in
conflict of interest, unless expressly or impliedly prohibited from
doing so, or if they fulfill certain conditions, such as disclo-
sure. ... Rules regulating fiduciaries would be far more specific
and dependent on the terms of the arrangement among the par-
ties."99 Calling a fiduciary duty simply another clause in a con-
tract "disregard[s] the reasons for the different rules that govern
them."100 One reason for these different rules, according to anti-
contractarians, is that fiduciary relationships "expose entrustors
to extraordinary risks" that "can result in a loss that far exceeds
the potential gain from the fiduciaries' services."101 In this model,
courts should therefore view fiduciary duties as something that
cannot be waived.102
94. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1781-82.
95. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426.
96. Id. at 438.
97. See, e.g., id. at 427 (asserting that the duty of loyalty comes at the high price of
specification and monitoring). Easterbrook and Fischel do not say outright that companies
should disavow fiduciary duties in order to gain the benefits of the "contract," but it can be
inferred from their statements dismissing unequal relationships as a justification for fidu-
ciary duties. For example, they say that "[pleople may take advantage of their superior
information, the better to induce them to gather information." Id. at 436. However, this
absence of explicit statement regarding the lack of disclosure has led to a collateral attack
on the contractarian position, with a demand for explicitness before the waiver can be said
to be in effect. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 1212.
98. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 428. ("Both sides would have
been better off had the court selected a rule that enabled them to save these costs.").
99. Frankel, supra note 5, at 1211.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1212.
102. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1782.
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Recently, however, some scholars have begun to contest this ei-
ther/or view of corporate governance. According to them, neither
the legal sanctions of fiduciary duties nor the market sanctions
that (supposedly) exist outside such duties adequately explain
why any corporation operates successfully despite the tempta-
tions for management to abscond with shareholder funds.103 These
scholars are sympathetic to anticontractarian viewpoints but ac-
knowledge and accept that current proposed solutions raise se-
rious problems for the corporate enterprise.1 0 4 Using empirical re-
search, especially in behavioral economics, they seek not only to
confirm anticontractarian arguments on the consequences of re-
ducing fiduciary duties, but to avoid the extensive costs (especial-
ly litigation costs) that are at the heart of contractarian con-
cerns.105 Based on this research, their focus has shifted to the
internalization of social norms, especially those concerning trust
and trustworthiness, as a better explanation. 10 6
In 2001, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argued that trust and
trustworthiness play a much larger role in corporate affairs than
previously believed.1 7 They argued that the two external sources
of restraint looked to in classic economic theory-legal and mar-
ket sanctions-cannot explain the trust that occurs between indi-
viduals.18 Legal sanctions are ultimately too tenuous; that is,
they are not backed up often enough by actual sanctions to be
more than a weak constraint. 109 Market sanctions-economic re-
taliation (i.e., refusal to do business), loss of reputation, and mere
social sanction (i.e., lack of friendliness)-rely on a high degree of
information. ° The resources needed to gather that information,
coupled with an unceasing view of all relationships as "strategic,
calculating, and self-interested," are beyond the ability of most
individuals."'
103. See, e.g., id. at 1738, 1780.
104. See id. at 1782.
105. See id. at 1759-80, 1797-99.
106. See id. at 1796-97.
107. See id. at 1738 ("We contend that people often trust, and often behave trustwor-
thily, to a far greater degree than can possibly be explained by legal or market incen-
tives.").
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1747.
110. See id. at 1748, 1750.
111. See id. at 1750.
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The alternative to these external restraints is trust. Trust, as
discussed by Blair and Stout involves three characteristics:
First, trust involves at least two actors-the actor who trusts and
the actor who is trusted. Second, the trusting actor must deliberately
make herself vulnerable to the trusted actor in circumstances in
which the trusted actor could benefit from taking advantage of the
trusting actor's vulnerability. Third, the trusting actor must make
herself vulnerable in the belief or expectation that the trusted actor
will in fact behave "trustworthily"-that is, refrain from exploiting
the trusting actor's vulnerability. 12
Obviously, the trusting actor is looking for a benefit from the
trust bestowed. For investors, trust is bestowed in the expecta-
tion that company managers will demonstrate fiscal responsibili-
ty (and thereby hopefully increase the value of their invest-
ment).1 13 But what is the basis for such trust? More importantly,
what is the basis for management not abusing that trust?
Empirical evidence indicates people often act in an "other-
regarding" fashion; that is, one that seeks the benefit of others
without a direct benefit to one's self.1 1 4 This internalized motiva-
tion is an efficient tool for groups that rely on social interactions
to thrive.115 It allows the trusting party to decide that it is more
efficient to trust an actor than to spend time and resources de-
termining and ensuring the actor acts in a trustworthy fashion.116
Similarly, it allows the trusted actor to decide that it is more effi-
cient (and ultimately more profitable) to act in a trustworthy fa-
shion. If this behavioral model can be deployed in corporations, it
may well address certain behavioral inefficiencies, such as agency
costs. 7
112. Id. at 1745-46 (footnotes omitted).
113. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 257-58.
114. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1752, 1761-62.
115. See id. at 1753.
116. See id. at 1757 ("Trust permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a hand-
shake rather than a complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources on
constant monitoring of employees and business partners .... Trust behavior also reduces
losses from others' undetectable or unpunishable opportunistic behavior, losses that could
discourage the formation of valuable agency and team production relationships in the first
place.").
117. Id. Agency costs are resources principals (shareholders) must expend in order to
determine and/or ensure agents (management) are properly acting on the principals' be-
half.
In fact, business mangers and scholars have long known about the importance of trust
in effective management and have long explored means to create trust in business rela-
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A corporation, or its agents, does not need to be inherently
trusting or trustworthy in order for Stout and Blair's proposal to
be realized. Social dilemma games demonstrate that trust can be
learned based upon an individual's experiences. 118 These experi-
ments demonstrate that even initially untrustworthy partici-
pants can become more trustworthy. 9 This is especially true
when they are engaged in multiple and long-term games where
cooperative behavior produces better results for all partici-
pants.120
Trust, however, is not necessarily robust. The same experi-
ments that demonstrate the viability of trust also make it clear
that people behave as they believe others in the same situation
are behaving. 12 In experiments where participants play repeated
social dilemma games, a pattern quickly emerges: the majority of
players either defect or cooperate. 22 It is interesting to note that
in social dilemma games actual acts of deception are not neces-
sary to undermine trust. Treating other players as if they were
untrustworthy or simple "trash talk" are just as effective in re-
ducing the trust between players. 23
The results of social dilemma games tend to support "the anti-
contractarian view that it is fundamentally misleading-even
dangerous-to apply the rhetoric of contract to fiduciary du-
ties."124 The theory of contracts assumes that each party is acting
purely in its own interest. 2 5 To bring such assumptions into the
realm of fiduciary duties both "assumes and legitimates" self-
interested behavior in a situation where one side already must
trust the other without protections. 126
tionships. Id. at 1758. Blair and Stout speculate that the reason theorists from the law
may be blind to this line of scholarship stems from the focus, in legal scholarship and legal
education, on situations where trust has broken down. See id. at 1759.
118. Id. at 1766-68. Social dilemma games involve situations where a group of individ-
uals is brought together and given something of value. The experimenters design situa-
tions whereby the subjects are given the opportunity to cooperate to achieve greater gain,
but also present each individual with either less risk or potentially greater individual gain
by refusing to cooperate. See id. at 1759-60.
119. See id. at 1774-75.
120. Id. at 1774.
121. See id. at 1776.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 1786.
125. Id. at 1784.
126. See id. (emphasis omitted).
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However, the empirical data which seemingly refutes a con-
tract approach also argues against the anticontractarian position
calling for greater enforcement of fiduciary duties in the courts. 127
Use of the courts to enforce fiduciary duties is ultimately just as
harmful to trust. Court actions have the effect of indicating that
fiduciary duties have been breached, even when courts find that
is not the case.' 28 The more such court cases are brought, the
more common the practice of fiduciary violations appears to be.129
Overuse of the courts leads to the result that more corporate di-
rectors and officers will seek to avoid or circumvent their fidu-
ciary responsibilities because, again, people tend to behave as
they believe others are behaving.120
This is not to say that court cases have no part to play in creat-
ing conditions in which trust may develop. 23 According to Blair
and Stout, "fiduciary duty law works through framing, not sham-
ing."11 32 A court's opinions, even when finding for director defen-
dants, are part of this framing process, as they influence behavior
by establishing the norms of fiduciary relationships. 133 What
judges say is important because
[slocial dilemma experiments indicate that individuals trying to de-
cide whether a particular social context calls for cooperation or com-
petition are remarkably sensitive to the signals they receive from
the experimenter who defines and has authority over the game. In
the context of corporate law, the court, as the authority charged with
both creating and enforcing many corporate law rules, may play the
role of the experimenter and enjoy similar influence. When the De-
laware chancery court trumpets the importance of careful attention
to fiduciary duties, directors and officers are likely to heed that
call-even though they may have little or no external incentive for
doing so."'
127. See id. at 1797.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See id. ("[Tirying to shore up trust behavior by making it easier for corporate par-
ticipants to 'litigate trust' may produce the counterintuitive result of an increase in the
incidence of the untrustworthy behavior.").
131. See id. at 1796.
132. Id. (emphasis omitted).
133. Id. at 1796-97 ("Courts preach these sermons not to enlist the aid of third-party
,norms enforcers,' but primarily to influence corporate participants' behavior more directly
by fleshing out the social context of their relationships, and particularly by framing rela-
tionships between managers and their firms as fiduciary relationships based on trust.").
134. Id. at 1797.
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Thus, when judges say to directors that there are certain stan-
dards which shareholders trust them to maintain (even when
seldom backed up by legal consequences), such standards may
well be internalized.135
The goal, then, would be to find a middle way, one that avoids
the problems of the free-for-all caveat emptor views of contracta-
rians on the one hand, and the over-regulated, perverse incen-
tive-creating views of the anticontractarians on the other. Blair
and Stout argue that this middle way involves directors and ex-
ecutives conducting themselves in a manner worthy of the trust
of the other and, ultimately, the shareholders.136
D. Why Trust May Work for Shareholders
Using Blair and Stout as a starting point, Sarah Helene Dug-
gin and Stephen M. Goldman focus on the need for directors and
other managers to re-establish trust with shareholders. 137 While
unsympathetic to the contractarian laissez-faire attitude regard-
ing fiduciary duties, Duggin and Goldman (like Blair and Stout),
argue that actions by Congress, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or the NYSE are not the most effective means of li-
miting corporate wrongdoing. 138 However well-intentioned, the
regulations put in place by these three entities are often counter-
productive and simply encourage those who wish to get around
them to find "loopholes."1 39
For Duggin and Goldman, the Disney litigation provides an al-
ternative to regulation.140 They begin with the infamous section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporation Law, which explicitly
states that a Delaware corporation's certificate of incorporation
135. Id. ("When the Delaware chancery court trumpets the importance of careful atten-
tion to fiduciary duties, directors and officers are likely to heed that call-even though
they may have little or no external incentive for doing so."). Blair and Stout's assertion on
this point has been supported by others. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 86, at 862.
136. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1799.
137. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 268 ("Unless directors are willing to act
conscientiously in overseeing the affairs of the corporations they manage, no matter how
talented or accomplished they may be, they are not worthy of trust, and they should not be
entitled to participate in managing the business entities so vital to the economic well-
being of their constituents." (footnotes omitted)).
138. See id. at 262-63.
139. See id. at 262.
140. For a summary of the Disney litigation, see supra note 85.
[Vol. 44:771
CONGRESS, CORPORATE BOARDS, AND OVERSIGHT
may contain "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a direc-
tor. . ."141 Interestingly, however, directors cannot opt out of lia-
bility for a breach of good faith. 142 As discussed above,'14 the Chan-
cery Court in Disney created a standard, approved by the
Supreme Court, whereby the provisions of section 102(b)(7) could
be enforced against directors:
I am of the opinion that the concept of intentional dereliction of duty,
a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (al-
though not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries
have acted in good faith. Deliberate indifference and inaction in the
face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to
the corporation. It is the epitome of faithless conduct.
4 4
The application of such a standard, if not defanged by defense
counsel, could provide the means for shareholders to begin to
trust company managers. An enforceable legal standard "pro-
vide[s] a means of holding those who accept.., corporate direc-
torships accountable to act when their duty to do so is clear."1' 45
Following Blair and Stout, Duggin and Goldman argue that the
most effective and efficient way for directors and other managers
to avoid liability would be to internalize the position of the
court-that is, to act not because the court requires it but because
the court's view is correct. 146 This approach would create directors
and executives who internalize the courts' standards and "are
willing to act conscientiously in overseeing the affairs of the cor-
porations they manage.' '4
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
142. Id. § 102(b)(7)(ii) ("[S]uch provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a
director.., for acts or omissions not in good faith ....").
143. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
144. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted), affd In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). Several commentators have noted this is a means of re-
establishing accountability. See, e.g., Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 268; Hill &
McDonnel, supra note 86, at 837-41 (suggesting the creation of a new intermediate stan-
dard of scrutiny within the business judgment rule akin to those of Unocal and Revlon).
Either way, directors must now see to it that they do in fact oversee the activities of their
corporations. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 272.
145. Duggin & Goldman, supra note 7, at 269.
146. See id. at 271-72.
147. Id. at 268.
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If application of the Disney standard has the trust-building re-
sult predicted by Duggin and Goldman, shareholders will benefit
because it eliminates the need to expend resources monitoring
corporations. The standard also avoids the problem of perverse
incentives because it does not create a rigid framework of "do
this, do that" that is a common complaint about Sarbanes-Oxley
and other measures adopted in the wake of corporate scandals
like the Enron fiasco. Instead, it calls those subject to the stan-
dard to do their duty.148 This results in a flexibility which allows
directors, executives, and shareholders to take into account evolv-
ing business and social ethics and thus requires that directors
and other managers keep abreast of such ethics. 149 In short, with
company managers acting in a trustworthy fashion more often,
shareholders are free to devote themselves to finding new in-
vestments instead of guarding old ones.
E. Why Trust May Work for Directors... and Managers
This approach is not merely beneficial for shareholders. It
could serve to address concerns of boards of directors as well. As
Jill E. Fisch and others have noted, under the current scheme of
corporate governance, a board has two contradictory functions. 50
As Fisch notes, boards must both monitor and manage."' This
means that a board is required to look out for shareholder inter-
ests; however, it simultaneously functions as part of management
in a corporation's business affairs-advising the CEO and other
officers, engaging in strategic planning, and reviewing significant
transactions-to further the money-making goals that are a cor-
poration's raison d'tre.12 The qualities that make good moni-
tors-independence, the lack of other business connections, and
the ability to make decisions free of company managers' input"1 -
148. Id. at 271-72.
149. Id. at 270.
150. See Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, supra note 78, at 268.
151. See id. Professor Fisch has noted that with the passage of Sabanes-Oxley and oth-
er additions to regulations by both the federal government and self regulating organiza-
tions (i.e., the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers), requiring significant independence of board members has probably positioned boards
having a primarily monitoring function. See Fisch, Federal Regulation, supra note 83 at
42-43. Obviously, no such similar event has occurred regarding Congress, therefore Pro-
fessor Fisch's observations can still be validly applied.
152. See Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, supra note 78, at 272.
153. See id. at 268-72.
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are not necessarily the same qualities that make good manag-
ers-namely, teamwork, experience, and long-term business rela-
tionships.154
Application of the concepts discussed by Blair and Stout and
Duggins and Goldman may serve to bridge these two functions. If
a board is not constantly wary of activist shareholders, it can bet-
ter carry out the managerial aspects of its duties. Furthermore, if
the rigid, formal requirements of monitoring are eliminated, the
monitoring aspect will benefit because it would be done by people
who understand the management of the corporation. 155
What trust ultimately provides is the freedom to view the long-
term picture of corporate affairs. If shareholders trust that direc-
tors do not waste their investments, they will not focus on quar-
terly earnings to the same degree. If directors trust that a bad
quarter will not lead to summary dismissal, they are more likely
to make long-term investments that may not immediately see
reward. Furthermore, trust affords directors more time to plan
and execute long-term strategies, thereby increasing their like-
lihood of success.
IV. APPLYING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
A. Congress and the President
This article now turns to a discussion of the parallels between
the boards of directors and of Congress's functions in further de-
tail and how the concept of trust in corporate governance might
be applied. Like boards of directors, Congress functions both to
manage and monitor. Congress manages in the sense that it has
154. Fisch, Federal Regulation, supra note 83, at 43; see Fisch, Taking Boards Serious-
ly, supra note 78, at 272-75.
155. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1757-58 (discussing the relationship between
promoting trust and competitive advantage); see also Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, su-
pra note 78, at 281 ("[A] board that maintains a greater distance may risk inadequately
understanding the company it is attempting to monitor.").
As an aside, trust may also serve to address a common concern of CEOs and other cor-
porate officers, namely that a board that views itself primarily as a monitor is likely to fire
the CEO during a period of diminished returns just to satisfy investors. See id. at 281.
Trust remembers, as it were, that corporations are entrepreneurial enterprises and some-
times a risk results in failure.
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the power to make law'-6 and the obligation to advise the execu-
tive because they often have far greater experience than the
term-limited President.157 It also has a responsibility to monitor
the executive to ensure that mutually agreed-upon policies are
carried out effectively and efficiently. 158 While the monitoring
function is under the spotlight for this article, the managing
function cannot be forgotten.
For those concerned about bad actors, the need for monitoring
is self-evident. However, for those concerned about the problems
that arise from over-regulation, perverse incentives, and other
unanticipated (and possibly unintended) consequences, the ar-
gument is that Congress's power to investigate provides the
means to expose such problems as they develop. In other words,
public scrutiny through congressional investigation blunts bad
results.
For the President, congressional investigation is fraught with
risk. It has often been used to thwart executive policies by a Con-
gress in the hands of the opposing party. The actions of the CCW
clearly demonstrate that committees can operate counter to
agreed-upon policy goals (like winning wars). 59 Yet committee
oversight can also further such goals, as evidenced by the conduct
of the Truman Committee.6 ° How can Congress and the President
agree to oversight that avoids abuse but does not restrict scruti-
ny?
The solution is trust. As discussed earlier, the CCW failed be-
cause everyone involved was looking out for his own interests,
everyone else knew it, and all sides acted accordingly. 6 1 Con-
versely, the basis for the Truman Committee's success lay in the
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... ").
157. The Constitution grants Congress the power to draft law, yet "[elvery bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but
if not he shall return it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
158. See FREDERICK M. KAISER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT MANUAL 2 (2007) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT MANUAL], available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf.
159. See TAP, supra note 15, at 165-66 (discussing the negative influence of the CCW
on the military during the Civil War).
160. See RIDDLE, supra note 50, at 152 (discussing the Truman Committee's success in
solving problems during the mobilization period).
161. See TAP, supra note 15, at 258.
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respect that it showed others.' 62 As a result, even those who disa-
greed with the committee viewed it as trustworthy and coope-
rated with it. 163
It should be possible to generate trust between Congress and
the President in oversight matters. First, the federal courts have
provided ample legal basis for Congress to engage in oversight
and provided instructions on how those subject to such investiga-
tions should respond.16
Second, as Blair and Stout discussed, and the Truman Com-
mittee's success evidenced, trust is vital.'6' If committees act to
further individual or partisan interests, they will fail as a tool of
governance. Both the trust experiments discussed in Blair and
Stout and the actions of the Truman Committee demonstrate
that people engaged in long-term and/or recurring relationships
are more likely to act in a trustworthy fashion. 66 In addition to
the value of long-term planning, this approach allows partici-
pants in civil government to maintain relationships beyond the
next election cycle. These suggestions will not create immediate
results. However, they are necessary groundwork for the legisla-
tive and executive branches to act in a trustworthy fashion and in
turn trust each other.
The benefits to trust in civil governance exist regardless of the
political make-up of the legislative and executive branches. For
Congress, trustworthy executive cooperation ensures that legisla-
tive policies are effective and allows for a working relationship
with the executive branch to develop future policies. 167 For the
President, trustworthy congressional oversight provides addi-
tional safeguards against bad or improper execution of policies. A
trusting relationship does not need to mean one branch must de-
fer to the other, but rather that policy debates are honest. The
for-me-or-against-me, take-no-prisoners approach that typified
the CCW guarantees a dysfunctional government and reduces po-
162. See RIDDLE, supra note 50, at 162.
163. Id.
164. OVERSIGHT MANUAL, supra note 158, at 32.
165. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1739; RIDDLE, supra note 50, at 165.
166. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1776-77; RIDDLE, supra note 50, at 141-42
(discussing the actions and accomplishments of the Truman committee).
167. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 2, at 2323 (explaining that when Congress and
the President align politically, the relationship between the two can shift from competitive
to cooperative).
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litical contests to mere finger-pointing.168 But acting in a trust-
worthy fashion elevates political debate because it allows for the
(perhaps shocking) notion that the ultimate purpose of govern-
ment is ensuring the well-being of the nation.
B. The Third Branch
The federal judiciary also has a role in promoting trust be-
tween Congress and the President. The President has enormous
resources at its command to both carry out policies and avoid
scrutiny. 169 The federal courts should redress this advantage and
restore balance between the other co-equal branches by: 1) refus-
ing to recognize that senior executive officials, or even the Presi-
dent, absolute immunity based on executive privilege in regards
to congressional investigations and 2) continuing to review and
demand action by executive agencies when appropriate.
The reasoning behind this proposal is two-fold. First, it would
serve notice that, even with legitimate executive privilege claims,
senior executive officials (up to and including the President) can-
not escape some degree of oversight by Congress. Such was the
position taken by the District of Columbia District Court in the
Miers case. 170 Relying on United States v. Nixon, the court noted
that executive privilege is not an immunity from compulsory
processes, but "a presumptive privilege that can be overcome by
the requisite demonstration of need.1 71 The court went on to say
that "[p]residential autonomy, such as it is, cannot mean that the
Executive's actions are totally insulated from scrutiny by Con-
gress. That would eviscerate Congress's historic oversight func-
168. See TAP, supra note 15, at 232. There exists the situation of having people in gov-
ernment who do not believe the government should be performing a particular function. I
would say that people who will act to keep government from properly functioning as a
means of limiting government action are acting in a deceptive manner. If they do not be-
lieve in the function, they should act to abolish it, not simply keep it from operating.
169. See generally Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empiri-
cal Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889 (2008).
170. Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d
53, 108 (D.D.C. 2008). President George W. Bush refused to let his senior aides testify be-
fore Congress regarding the dismissal of eight U.S. Attorneys. Id. at 55-56. He asserted
that his senior aides have absolute immunity from giving compelled Congressional testi-
mony based on executive privilege. Id. at 56.
171. Id. at 102 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-08 (1974)).
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tion."1 7 2 Even if the privilege is found to be legitimately invoked,
the reasons must be stated to Congress. 173
The second action would remind the President that the federal
courts also serve as a source of executive oversight. This was pre-
cisely the holding of Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency .1 There, the Supreme Court found that the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA") failed to carry out its statutory du-
ties and ordered it to do so.' 7 This is not to say that the Court can
replace Congress as the overseer of the executive, but is meant to
point out that the executive's actions cannot escape scrutiny by
the other co-equal branches of government. 76
Such action by the courts would bolster the oversight role of
Congress. First, it would create legal doctrine, in addition to
those discussed earlier, that support congressional oversight. 77
Second, and equally important, the courts would legitimize over-
sight beyond the merely legal. Congressional oversight involves
politically powerful actors; therefore, the law of congressional
oversight, just as the law of fiduciary duties, would ultimately
function not so much through fear of sanction but through the in-
ternalization of the norms of behavior espoused by the courts. 178
As noted by Blair and Stout, court decisions function as "judicial
'sermons' on proper motives and conduct that filter down to direc-
tors, officers, and shareholders.' 79 The same would apply here.
Faced with the choice of oversight by Congress or the courts,
the executive branch would do well to choose the legislative
branch. It is far better to negotiate with the other federal branch
also subject to the will of the people than to rely on the whims of
politically immune judges. The executive branch must then act in
a trustworthy fashion, for efficiency's, if not propriety's, sake.
172. Id. at 103.
173. See id. at 106.
174. 549 U.S. 497, 533-35 (2007).
175. Id. at 534-35.
176. Id. at 527-28 (describing the Court's power of review, yet emphasizing its narrow
scope).
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 1795-96 (discussing role of fiduciary duty law
in internalizing norms of behavior espoused by the courts).
179. Id. at 1796.
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Granted, Congress would have to reciprocate, but actions beget
like actions.180
V. CONCLUSION
Civil governance and corporate governance scholars agree, at
the very least, that no perfect system of governance can be
created by means of organizational structures and strict rules.
Our current federal system was designed by the Founders to (1)
prevent dominance by the legislature and (2) prevent the rise of
political parties. Their success in achieving the first goal has re-
sulted in giving the executive branch a dominant role in govern-
ment, arguably an equally undesirable result.' Their failure in
achieving the second goal has led to exactly the kind of factional-
ism that Washington warned about in 1796.182
Change of some sort would be welcome. Congress and the Pres-
ident are consistently named as two of the least liked institutions
in the United States.183 The collapse of major investment banks
has been exacerbated in part by the 107th, 108th, and 109th Re-
publican Congresses' failure to exercise oversight to ensure that
the Republican President's actions would accomplish policy goals
that both branches presumably held in common. 84 While trust as
discussed by Blair and Stout and Duggin and Goldman may not
provide all of the answers, it would at least provide tools to im-
prove civil governance, prevent systemic failure, and perhaps
even increase public confidence in its elected officials.
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Monks, these two extremes should not be followed by one who
has gone forth as a wanderer. What two? They are the pursuit of
sense pleasures, vulgar practice of villagers, ignoble practice, unpro-
fitable; and the pursuit of self-mortification, which is painful, ig-
noble, and unprofitable. By avoiding these two extremes, the
Tathagata [The Buddha] has awakened to the middle path which
gives rise to insight, which gives rise to knowledge, which leads to
calm, direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to nibbzna [nirvana] .185
185. ORIGINAL BUDDHIST SOURCES 47 (Carl Olson ed., 2005) (emphasis added).

